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This study’s purpose was to explore the effect of board diversity in leadership on 
corporate financial performance. Specifically, the study aimed at determining the effect 
of board diversity on financial performance of commercial banks in Kenya to ascertain 
whether there is a causal association between the specific board characteristics of gender, 
age and nationality on the financial performance of commercial banks in Kenya. Thus, 
the research adopted an exploratory design. All commercial banks formed the primary 
target in the study. There were forty-two banks in Kenya based on the 2017 Bank 
Supervision Report by the CBK (Central Bank of Kenya). Pertinent data in the study was 
sourced from secondary sources. Panel data regression analysis was applied to ascertain 
the association between board diversity and financial performance of the commercial 
banks. The study results indicated that board age diversity did not have a significant 
effect on financial performance measured through ROA and Tobin’s Q. Similarly, gender 
diversity had insignificant effect on financial performance of the commercial banks in 
Kenya measured through both ROA and Tobin’s Q. Further, nationality diversity was not 
significantly related with financial performance of the commercial banks as measured 
through both ROA and Tobin’s Q. Study results also indicated that board diversity (BD) 
did not have a significant effect on ROA as well as Tobin’s Q of the commercial banks. 
The recommendations made from these findings is that when selecting boards members, 
shareholders should consider having a board that is composed of members from different 
ethnic, cultural, gender and nationalities which is expected to provide a diverse view of 
managerial and strategic issues. However, diversity should not only be considered for its 
own sake but should be considered on how well it will enhance the board leadership and 
control role in the firm. The study also recommends to the shareholders of companies to 
ensure that demographic diversity is informed by the interests of the companies, and not 






1.1 Introduction  
Does the diversity of the board have an impact on an organization’s performance? This 
question forms a key focus of research in corporate management and governance. The 
board operates as a bridge between managers and owners; it has the mandate to cushion 
shareholders’ interests. In particular, while taking responsibility for supervising and 
managing, the board directs managers’ behaviours with a focus on shareholders’ 
interests, employs management teams, make important decisions, and oversee the firm’s 
operations to ensure that it abides by the rule of law. Generally, boards are differently 
structured and have varied impacts on corporate decisions. Often diversity has been 
associated with variations amongst board members. Therefore, the study aimed at 
examining the association between firm performance and board diversity of commercial 
banks in Kenya. 
 
1.2 Background of the study 
Board diversity is defined by Langevoort (2016) as having a range of many people that 
are different from each other in terms of demographic characteristics, professional 
qualifications, skills and experiences to make the board less homogenous. Various 
policies, practices and organizations advocated for board diversity as it is projected to 
have a variety of benefits including better utilization of the talent pool, more effective 
decision making and enhancement of investor relations and corporate reputation by 
portraying the organization as a responsible corporate citizen (Raheja, 2015). The United 
States Conference Board’s report (Martino, 1999) crafted with anecdotal evidence from 
some major corporations like Ford Motor, IBM, Lucent, Nortel, Texaco, Sara Lee, and 
DuPont cited the concept of board diversity as a vital success factor for business. The 
report identifies a change in turnout rates, labor market demographics, and productivity 
gains of diverse teams as a principle promoter for diversity. More so, the report indicates 
that companies that are truly diversified have incorporated women and minorities in 
every workforce level including among the board members/directors. In areas of 
professional codes or regulations, more countries are increasingly paying attention to 
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boards’ diversity. For instance, among public listed corporations, Canada expect boards’ 
constitutions to be engaged in a principled process to establish, based on the risks and 
opportunities (that is, the environment) affecting the organization, what skills, 
competencies and personal traits should be put into perspective while selecting new 
members of the board. This is in order to bring more value to the board and the 
corporation. More so, corporations are encouraged to actively look beyond traditional 
sources while seeking women and men who have the right mix of competencies and 
experience.  
 
In Australia, boards are expected to encompass directors who have appropriate 
competencies to promote their effectiveness in discharging their mandate. On the other 
hand, in Singapore, the tradition is that boards should include directors who provide key 
competencies such as finance or accounting, management or business experience, 
strategic planning experience, industry knowledge, and customer-based knowledge or 
experience. In a determined hypothesis that the Sarbanes-Oxley reform did not recognize 
or establish the importance of the board’s diversity in enhancing its functioning, Ramirez 
(2003) postulates on how other countries like Israel have progressed ahead of the United 
States of America - in Israel since 1993 it has been a requirement for boards of directors 
in companies to be selected while considering gender diversity. Similarly, the Norwegian 
government provided that at least 40% of board member’s positions among corporations 
in the country should be occupied by women by the year 2005. More states are studying 
how organizations would gain from enhanced diversity in their boards. 
 
While diversity is denoted literally as having differences, Kahn (2002), underlines that it 
has been altered into a focused strategic course for valuing differences. Differences can 
be related to gender, age, nationality, physical appearance, job experience or function, 
culture, personal style, disability, ethnicity, and religion. Strong propositions still linger 
regarding business and conceptual propositions on diversity. A diverse leadership and 
workforce within a firm may promote its competitiveness in terms of generating several 
viewpoints and ideas viable for decision-making, appealing to a larger employees’ and 
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stakeholders’ base, and more so, supporting and retaining existing and potentially acquire 
new consumers from the minorities (Cox, 1993). 
 
The concept of diversity in the board dictates that boards should reflect on societal 
structures and properly represent ethnicity, gender and professional background in their 
choice of members of the board. This is necessary to generate diversified viewpoints. 
Diversity in a board should be morally supported by the stakeholders and shareholders so 
as to provide the firm with financial gains by obtaining all-inclusive decisions (Daily & 
Dalton, 2003). Diversity in terms of gender is noted as part of a broader board’s 
conception in diversity and most scholars have indicated that only a few women globally 
sit at the board. Julizaerma and Sori (2012) in a study in Malaysia noted that compared to 
men, women directors often possessed competencies in managerial skills especially 
public relations, legal, communications and human resources as opposed to marketing 
and operating skills. This hence implied the need to incorporate a mix of both male and 
female directors in the board so as to have a board with a mix of many professional and 
technical backgrounds.  
 
This study sought to assess the effect of board diversity on corporate financial 
performance of commercial banks. The study focused on gender, nationality and age 
diversity. Ferrero-Ferrero, Fernández-Izquierdo and Muñoz-Torres (2015) established 
that age diversity measures the extent tow which members from different age groups 
(mostly young) are incorporated in the board. Gender diversity on other hand, focusses 
on how well the board has incorporated both male and female members. Additionally, 
nationality diversity indicates the extent to which the board has members from different 
countries. Theories that predict a positive effect of board diversity on corporate financial 
performance include the resource dependence, human capital and group diversity 
theories. Resource dependence theory by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) presented the 
resource dependence theory that posits that age diversity has the potential to enhance 
board performance, because directors of different ages will, to some extent, have 
different backgrounds, skills, experiences and social networks. Becker (1964) through the 
human capital theory argues that if directors are from different genders, it is more likely 
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that their networks will be different from each other, which will make the firm’s total 
social capital to be high.  Cox (1993) developed the group diversity theory which posits 
that a nationality diverse board is in a better position to effectively meet the diverse needs 
of the global stakeholders. This implies that a nationality diverse board will lead to 
enhanced financial performance. 
 
Corporate financial performance can be construed in several ways. Mostly, it has been 
indicated as the utility benefits that accrue to the company’s stakeholders (Rashid, Islam 
& Anderson 2008). The continuing viability of an organization is contingent on its 
capacity to net suitable returns from its capital and assets. Decent earnings performance 
boosts an institution’s capacity to support its expansion, increase and replenish its 
earnings from capital valuation, and maintain its competitiveness in the marketplace. 
Corporate financial performance heavily relies on the comparison of main profitability 
measures like return on asset and return on equity to peer groups, past company’s 
performance and industry benchmark. 
 
Financial performance is a measure of how well a firm is using its assets from its primary 
mode of business to generate revenues and value for the different stakeholders. This term 
is also used as a general measure of a firm's overall financial health over a given period 
of time. A number of different measures of firm performance are employed to assess the 
financial performance of the firm. These measures include accounting-based ratios from 
balance sheet and income statements such as Return on Assets (ROA), Return on Equity 
(ROE), return on capital employed (ROCE) and other such measures such as Tobin's Q, 
which mixes market values with accounting values and finally measures of profit 
efficiency such as managerial efficiency computed using a profit function (Sadeghian et 
al., 2012).  
 
ROA shows the percentage of net earnings relative to the company’s total assets. The 
ROA ratio specifically reveals how much after-tax profit a company generates for every 
shilling worth of assets the company has. ROE expresses the percentage of net income 
relative to stockholders’ equity, or the rate of return on the money that equity investors 
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have put into the business. The ROE ratio is one that is particularly watched by stock 
analysts and investors. A favorably high ROE ratio is often cited as a reason to purchase 
a company’s stock. ROCE is a measure of return generated by all providers of capital, 
including both bondholders and shareholders. It is similar to the ROE ratio, but more all-
encompassing in its scope since it includes returns generated from capital supplied by 
bondholders. Tobin’s Q is a ratio of market value of the assets owned by the firm on the 
book value of assets. This study used ROA and Tobin’s Q as the measures of financial 
performance since these two indicators are all encompassing as they indicate the value 
provided by utilizing all assets of the firm. Moreover, these measures have been applied 
in various studies including Weill (2018), Trujillo-Ponce (2017), Vitor and Badu (2016) 
and Tauseef, Lohan and Khan (2015).  
 
The board of directors is often regarded as an organizations’ highest decision-making 
body. As an important dimension for diversity, the board’s structure provides 
considerable influence on the organization’s important dimensions and has the capability 
to substantially influence the board actions, the firm’s corporate governance and 
ultimately the financial performance of the firm (Carter, et al., 2010; Kim, Burns, & 
Prescott, 2009). Researchers conceptualize corporate board dimensionally detailing the 
board as an encompassment of members from diverse groups and also, as an individual 
entity that validates whether the directors’ diversity (director heterogeneity) influences a 
board’s functioning (Ferreira, 2010). Therefore, this research validates previous positions 
and scrutinizes how diversity in the board is linked to the company’s performance. The 
current study focused on age, gender and nationality only as they are the aspects of 
diversity which have been consistently established to influence firm performance in 
various studies across the globe (Julizaerma & Sori, 2012). Moreover, most regulations 
and advocacy regarding board diversity focus on these aspects.  
 
A study by Kenya Institute of Management (2017) established that 62% of the listed 
companies had at least one non-Kenyan in their board which compares well with the 74% 
global average. On board diversity influence on corporate performance, gender diversity 
when female representation is at least 25% was found to have a positive influence on the 
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organizations’ compounded annual growth rate of assets and revenues. Moreover, 
Barclays Bank board had a 50% gender representation which made it the most gender 
diverse of any listed firm in Kenya. Further, the study established that the average entry 
age into the boardroom was 50 years globally. A significant difference in entry age 
between the genders was noted with female board members entering at 48 years while 
their male counterparts had to wait, on average, until 52 years. The study also revealed 
that there is a lack of millennials in the boardroom. Millennials make up the world’s 
biggest demographic group and are expected to make up 50% of the workforce by 2020. 
However, most boardrooms lack this age group. The current study hence sought to 
investigate the effect of board diversity on the financial performance of commercial 
banks.  
 
1.3 Problem Statement 
The attention of scholars, academics, managers, policy makers, shareholders and 
directors has been drawn towards board diversity as a critical concept in corporate 
governance (Johansen, 2008). In today’s growing global market, the concept of diversity 
seems to encompass differences in terms of ethnicity, gender, physical abilities, age, as 
well as perspective, attitudes, and background differences. On corporate boards, several 
forms of diversity could be identified among directors including gender, age, ethnicity, 
religion, culture, professional background, constituency representation, knowledge, 
technical expertise and skills, industry and commercial experience, life and career 
experience. Theories that support board diversity’s positive effect on the firm include 
resource dependency theory, group diversity theory and human capital theory (Carter et 
al., 2010). 
 
Diversity within the board increases the chances of having rival factions and conflict, 
generated based on the diverse interpretations of the organization’s goals and policies. 
However, a proliferation of accounting scandals has enhanced the value of accountability 
in organizations and hence encouraging organizations to put up structures of good 
governance to improve accountability. There have been various studies that have been 
conducted in developed nations relating gender diversity with corporate social reporting 
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in commercial banks. Moreover, studies abound relating diversity in boards and corporate 
financial performance in the developed nations. However, it is just recently that the 
attention has shifted into investigating the role played by board governance and diversity 
on corporate financial performance in emerging nations.  
 
This study aimed to establish the value derived from board diversity with respect to the 
financial performance of commercial banks in Kenya. There was a lacuna in literature 
regarding the relationship between the board’s diversity and financial performance of 
commercial banks in Kenya. Nevertheless, Barako and Brown (2008) identified that 
boards’ diversity in the Kenyan banking industry enhanced corporate social reporting. 
The subject of board diversity and firm performance had been researched in Kenya by 
authors such as Ekadah and Mboya (2012). However, the study by Ekadah and Mboya 
(2012) was conducted with data from 1998 to 2009 and focused on women representation 
in corporate boards which was very low. Moreover, this study only focused on gender 
diversity and failed to consider nationality and age and other aspects of diversity. 
 
The Institute of Directors in Kenya (2016) conducted a survey indicating that much 
improvement had been made after the promulgation of the constitution of Kenya (2010) 
and Capital Markets Authority (CMA) guidelines on increasing women representation on 
boards. The study established that boards of professional associations consisted of 26% 
women up from less than 6% in 2010. Moreover, women representation in boards of 
insurance companies had increased to 15% from 5%. The survey also established that 
though banks had the lowest women representation in boards at 12%, it was an 
improvement from 4% in 2010. Moreover, the survey established that one commercial 
bank (Standard Chartered Bank) also had a woman as chair of the board. This indicates 
that a lot of improvement and changes regarding women representation in boards have 
taken place today compared to when the time of the study by Ekadah and Mboya (2012). 
Despite the lack of consensus on the effect of board diversity on financial performance, 
many regulatory authorities are instituting policies that seek to increase diversity in 
corporate boards. This study sought to establish whether the increased diversity in 
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corporate boards of commercial banks have brought any significant effects on financial 
performance.  
 
This study used current data on board diversity and bank performance and thus provided 
a concrete indication on whether the improvements in board diversity had led to any 
changes in financial performance by the commercial banks. It is expected that the 
knowledge gained from the study may lead to proper conceptualization of those factors 
which are responsive to policy.  
 
1.4 Study Objectives  
1.4.1 General objective 
The research aimed to determine the connection between combined measure of board 
diversity and corporate financial performance of commercial banks in Kenya.  
 
1.4.2 Specific objectives 
In particular, the research aimed: 
i. To establish the effect of boards’ gender diversity on financial 
performance of commercial banks in Kenya.  
ii. To evaluate the effect of boards’ nationality diversity on financial 
performance of commercial banks in Kenya. 
iii. To examine what influence board age diversity has on commercial banks 
in Kenya in terms of financial performance.  
iv. To evaluate the effect of combined board diversity (comprising of age, 
nationality and gender) on financial performance of commercial banks in 
Kenya. 
 
1.5 Research questions 
i. What effect does a boards’ gender diversity have on financial performance 
of commercial banks in Kenya?  
ii. What is the effect of the boards’ nationality diversity on financial 
performance of commercial banks in Kenya?  
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iii. To what level does the boards’ age diversity affect financial performance 
of commercial banks in Kenya? 
iv. What is the effect of combined board diversity comprising of age, 
nationality and gender on financial performance of commercial banks in 
Kenya? 
 
1.6 Scope of the study 
The study focused on all Kenyan commercial banks. These banks were forty-two (42) in 
number based on the Kenyan Central Bank’s Supervision Report of 2015. However, only 
38 commercial banks were included in the study as they had full results for five years 
(2012 – 2016). All these banks were studied since a comprehensive and entire 
representative analysis was required from the entire banking sector in Kenya. This study 
focused on commercial banks as the sector had experienced increasing competition in 
recent years as banks competed to recruit new customers and target new markets 
(Mokaya & Kipyegon, 2016). This was indicated by the increasing number of banks and 
the competition from mobile money services. Since the banking sector is the cornerstone 
of the financial sector and the base upon which the economy and all other industries 
revolve, the factors that influence their performance need to be investigated to sustain 
their good financial health. The contributions of commercial banks in economic 
development have been accelerated with the roll out of innovative banking products such 
as internet banking, mobile banking and agency banking. The study covered a period of 
five years 5 years (2012-2016) and the unit of analysis was the commercial bank. 
 
1.6 Significance of the study 
The study will be of value as it will provide evidence on the role played by board gender, 
age and nationality diversity on the financial performance of commercial banks in Kenya. 
More importantly, the study will establish the role played by the combined board 
diversity score on financial performance of the commercial banks. This will be of 





The study will provide the researcher with relevant knowledge and experience in research 
and inform the researcher on whether board diversity has an effect on corporate financial 
performance of commercial banks in Kenya. As an employee in the banking sector, the 
researcher will use the findings from the study to advocate for enhanced board 
governance and diversity considering the empirical findings. Lastly, the research was part 
of the academic requirements to attain a master’s degree. The research will hence enable 
the researcher to fulfill the academic requirements to attain the master’s degree. 
 
1.6.2 Shareholders 
The shareholders will be sensitized on the importance of ensuring that the board selected 
represents all or majority of those characteristics or groups deemed critical in maximizing 
the value and wealth of the firm. Moreover, the findings may result in changes to the 
board of directors making them more effective and efficient in their activities that leads to 
the achievement of objectives such as to deliver value to customers and returns to the 
shareholders’ investment. The boards will become more aware of how their activities 
affect the return to shareholders’ value. 
 
1.6.3 Management and Policy Makers 
This study was conducted to establish the effect that board diversity has on corporations’ 
profitability. It was influenced by background evidence from authors such as 
Gulamhussen and Santa (2010) that suggests gender diversity considerations in 
boardrooms could enhance value to a company by enabling the board to manage risk, 
audit and relationships management. Therefore, this research aimed to address such 
issues by observing boards’ diversity among commercial banks in Kenya. Similarly, the 
research aims to answer questions regarding relationship between corporations’ financial 
performance and the diversity of their boards and whether more benefits exist from the 
board’s diversity in business environment. The findings shall provide insight to policy 







This chapter discusses the empirical and theoretical literature associated with the 
relationship between the board’s structure (in contrast to the board procedures) and the 
company’s performance. The chapter first presents the theories that inform board 
diversity and how it influences corporate performance. The chapter analyses available 
literature on the subject in accordance to the study objectives. The literature review 
provides a foundation for the study on board diversity.  
 
2.2 Theoretical Review 
The current study was based on the resource dependence, human capital and group 
diversity theories. These theories provided the theoretical basis for conceptualizing the 
influence of board diversity on corporate financial performance. The three theories are 
discussed hereunder in detail.  
 
2.2.1 Resource Dependence Theory 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) presented the resource dependence theory, in which a firm is 
viewed as an open system which depends on contingencies in their external environment 
(Hillman et al., 2009). To fully understand a firm, one must thus understand the context 
of the firm. According to this theory, the board of directors is seen as a tool to manage 
external dependency, reduce environmental uncertainty and reduce transaction costs 
associated with environmental interdependency by linking the organization with its 
external environment (Lynall et al., 2003). This theory provides the study with a more 
appropriate theoretical framework to study diversity on the board of directors and firm 
performance (Carter et al., 2010). However, the theory does not provide the mechanics 
and processes that make a more age diverse board to perform better than ales diverse 
board.  
 
According to the resource dependence theory a board provides four primary benefits for 
the firm: 1) provision of resources such as information and expertise; 2) creation of 
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channels of communication with constituents of importance of the firm; 3) provision of 
commitments of support from important organizations or groups in the external 
environment; and 4) creation of legitimacy for the firm in the external environment. 
Boards are important sources for counsel and advise and they enhance the reputation and 
legitimacy of the firm (Lynall et al., 2003). Interlocks between directors have also been 
found to be important for the dissemination of information across firms, as well as 
securing preferential access to critical resources. 
 
An important notion of this theory is that directors bring different resources and linkages 
to the board, and board composition should therefore be adjusted to the specific needs of 
the firm. The board composition should be adjusted over time when the needs of the firm 
changes (Hillman et al., 2009). Small firms and firms in early stages of the lifecycle may 
also better benefit from the resources the board provides in comparison with larger and 
more mature firms. Age diversity has the potential to enhance board performance, 
because directors of different ages will, to some extent, have different backgrounds, 
skills, experiences and social networks. Carter et al. (2010) state this clearly when they 
argue that age diversity holds the potential to improve the information provided by the 
board to managers due to the unique information held by diverse directors. 
 
2.2.2 Human Capital Theory 
Human capital theory was developed by Becker in (1964) and includes a person’s 
education, experience and skills that can be used to add value to an organization. Human 
capital can be either firm specific or general (Singh, 2007). According to human capital 
theory, gender diversity will affect board performance as a result of a diverse and unique 
human capital (Carter et al., 2010). The effect on financial performance can, however, be 
positive as well as negative and the usefulness of an individual’s human capital may be 
dependent on a firm’s internal and external circumstances. This theory does not however 
prescribe the circumstances that diversity in gender can pose negative effects in the firm.  
 
Social capital is created when individuals or organizations interact (Singh, 2007). An 
example being the knowledge and information communicated in networks of 
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relationships that facilitates instrumental action. Economic actions are both informed, 
influenced and enabled by the network of social relations (Lynall et al., 2003). In a 
relationship network the social actors are interconnected to other social actors in a 
crisscrossing pattern with varying strengths (Singh, 2007). A network that is extensive 
and with many areas unconnected will provide better access to more and diverse 
information. Demographic similarities among directors will reflect the interorganizational 
network (Lynall et al., 2003). If directors therefore are from different genders, it is more 
likely that their networks will be different from each other, which will make the firm’s 
total social capital to be high (Singh, 2007). The board’s social capital therefore becomes 
important to the functioning of the board (Murphy and McIntyre, 2007). 
 
2.2.3 Group Diversity Theory 
Cox (1993) developed the group diversity theory to inform the concept of cultural 
diversity in organizations. Cox defined diversity as the inclusion in a group of members 
with distinctly different cultural significance and group affiliations. Cox, Lobel and 
McLeod (1991) had earlier observed from field and laboratory settings that diversity 
within groups had improved the effectiveness of the group. This created the notion of 
value-in-diversity concept. Cox (1993) then later developed this concept to the group 
diversity theory. This theory postulates that when a group is made up of individuals from 
diverse backgrounds, that group becomes more effective than a group made up of 
individuals from similar backgrounds. The strength of this theory is that it provides the 
diversity aspects in board nationality that can make a firm to enhance its performance. 
However, it fails to prescribe how much diversity is good and what diversity may fail to 
have positive effects.   
 
This study applied this theory to inform how nationality diversity is expected to relate to 
performance. Board performance is then linked to firm performance. The diversity issues 
focused on in this study include age, nationality and gender. Nevertheless, Pelled et al. 
(1999) observed that not all cases of diversity breed effectiveness. Following this debate, 
Mazur (2010) noted that diversity in the work place is becoming more important with the 
advent of globalization. This is because organizations are now finding themselves 
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required to cope with the needs of stakeholders that are more culturally mixed. The 
global market place is hence underlining the need for workforces of companies, including 
their board of directors, to be more diverse, since a diverse board is in a better position to 
effectively meet the diverse needs of the global stakeholders. This implies that a 
nationality diverse board will lead to enhanced financial performance.  
 
2.3 Empirical Review 
2.3.1 Board gender diversity and financial performance 
There are conflict views regarding the effect of board gender diversity on financial 
performance. According to Julizaerma and Sori (2012), board gender diversity is the 
inclusion of women on a corporations’ board of directors. While this area is attracting 
growing interest for corporate governance research over the recent years, many empirical 
studies on the topic are restricted to developed nations. Empirical evidence seemingly 
points to women’s presence in the corporate boards as responsible for various positive 
organizational financial outcomes. The connection between the firm’s performance and 
gender diversity in the corporate boards has evidently been inconclusive, and still 
requires further empirical enquiry. Some studies (for example Dezso & Ross, 2012; 
Smith et al., 2006) underlined a significant and positive relationship between firm’s 
performance and gender diversity 
 
Other arguments endorse the proposition of greater gender diversity to be advantageous 
to the firm for several reasons. Often, women are deliberated to have a “feeling” or 
cognitive style which focuses on harmony to facilitate information dissemination. 
Moreover, they are considered “tough” because they must encounter several challenges 
before holding such seats at the board, that reward them with great prestige at the 
environment. Diversity in gender also results in increased innovation and creativity 
(Campbell and Minguez-Vera, 2008). 
 
Mazur (2010) argues that boards that incorporate women directors have less problems of 
director attendance and as such, they play their monitoring role on the CEOs effectively 
and hence reducing cases of CEO turnover. Due to this effective monitoring, such firms 
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usually perform better than their peers who have less or no women in their boards. 
Further, Mazur (2010) argues that women directors not only have fewer problems of 
meeting attendance but also, they influence the overall behavior of attendance among 
directors (plus men) when more women are incorporated in the board. Relevant to this 
high level of the board’s functioning, costs exist to intensify monitoring (Faleye & 
Hoitash, 2011). Conversely, a research by Aosa (2012) underlining the impact of the 
board’s gender diversity on corporation’s financial performance established insignificant 
relationship.  
 
Carter et al. (2003) elucidated on the relationship between corporate performance and 
board gender diversity as per the theory of agency and they observed that the board’s 
gender diversity improves its ability to supervise the top management. Additionally, they 
indicate that by increasing the number of women directors, increases independence of the 
board since they tend to raise questions which may not be raised by male directors. 
Moreover, Smith et al. (2006), holds that board’s gender diversity improves problem 
solving since several perspectives arise thus more options are assessed in the process. 
Moreover, a more gender diversified board could also enhance a company competitive 
advantage as long as it enhances the firm’s image and if this has a positive effect on the 
customers’ actions, hence it, in turn, results in a positive effect on a company’s financial 
performance. 
 
In the US, Dezso and Ross (2012) conducted a research using panel data from 15 years 
panel on the team of top management among S&P 1,500 companies. The research 
explored longitudinal data to provide inclusion of corporations’ fixed effects on all 
regressions. The researcher established that female representation in the top management 
enhances corporations’ performance. Julizaerma and Sori, (2012) in Malaysia conducted 
a study and observed that there is a positive association between a firm’s performance 
and gender diversity (Return on Assets). Similarly, Fan (2012) in Singapore, using up to 
390 observations from distinct sectors in the Singaporean Exchange from 2002 – 2004 in 
gender performance and diversity, noted that the evidence supported a positive linkage 
between the board’s financial performance and diversity. The research used multiple 
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regressions for simultaneous equations in analyzing control for possible endogeneity 
problem (Tobin’s Q). 
 
Smith et al. (2006) conducted a research in Denmark to assess if more women at the top 
management impact a firm’s performance. Exploring data from about 2,500 of the largest 
Danish companies from 1993-2001 and applying ordinary least squares regression, the 
research found that a percentage of women at the top jobs’ management tend to 
demonstrate positive effects on corporate performance, more so, after controlling 
numerous traits of the company and causality direction. In Spain, Campbell and 
Minguez-Vera (2007) established that the proportion of women in the board of directors 
has a significant positive influence on corporations’ financial performance (Tobin’s Q 
value).  
 
Similarly, a study by Bart and McQueen (2013) in the US, reported that women directors 
attained significantly higher scores compared to their male colleagues, on dimensions of 
complex moral reasoning that essentially entails making decisions that are consistently 
fair when interests that are competing are at stake. Bart and McQueen, in their study 
noted that directors are often compelled to make decisions that are based on the interest 
of their firm while putting into account viewpoints from multiple stakeholders. Therefore, 
having a significant proportion of women directors in the board with a more developed 
moral reasoning capacity, could appear as a vital resource in such types of decision-
making and hence boosting the sustainability of the firm. 
 
In contrast, other scholars indicate that boards that have high gender diversity could 
create disadvantages to the company. High gender diversity could increase the likelihood 
of conflict, slow the process of decision-making and lessen cohesion in relation to risk 
perception and response to risks that face the corporation (Joshi et al., 2006). Increased 
gender diversity of the board might also reduce a corporations’ performance, by lessening 
the board’s ability to provide leadership and corporate governance. Heterogeneous group 
members frequently communicate less as they are more likely to hold dissimilar opinions 
hence resulting in conflicts. Boards with a high gender diversity create more conflicts in 
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decision-making, hold diverse opinions and hence become less effective and more time 
consuming. Moreover, Haslam et al. (2010) noted that women in boards lower the value 
of an organization due to increased absenteeism and higher turnover. Additionally, high 
gender diversity in the board could also negatively affect a corporation’s performance, if 
the female directors are selected not based on competence but as “token” or just as a way 
to adhere to policy or regulations (Earley and Mosakowski, 2000). Other studies (such as 
Bohren & Strom, 2006; Haslam et al., 2010) had similar findings and found a negative 
relationship between the gender diversity of the board and corporate financial 
performance. 
 
Dutta and Bose (2006) conducted a research in Bangladesh and found an inconsistent 
association between gender diversity of the board of directors and financial performance 
(Return on Equity and Return on Asset) of commercial banks in Bangladesh. The 
research applied the Kruskal-Wallis H test, a non-parametric research methodology, to 
evaluate a sample of 15 banks. This methodology could partially explain why the 
research provided conflicting results from distinct levels of significance hence no valid 
conclusion. Other empirical studies (for example Ekadah & Mboya, 2012; Carter et al., 
2010) had consistent research findings and found no significant relationship between 
board gender diversity and financial performance of the firm. 
 
Moreover, there is a series of findings whose evidence supports a significant negative 
association between a firm’s performance and gender diversity. For instance, in the 
United Kingdom, Haslam et al (2010) investigated the correlation between the presence 
of women on a company’s board and both stock-based and accountancy-based measures 
of corporation’s performance. Multiple regression analysis approach was employed in the 
study and data from years 2001 to 2005 on financial time stock’s index targeting 100 
companies (the 100 firms are listed at the London’s Stock Exchange with highest market 
capitalization). Researchers observed a significant negative linkage between the presence 




On their part, Bohren and Strom (2006) revealed that boards’ gender diversity is 
negatively associated with financial performance from non-financial firms that are listed 
at the Oslo’s Stock Exchange. Similarly, Haslam et al (2010) described a negative 
relationship in women being on the boards and the stock-based benchmarking for 
performance. Adams and Ferreira (2009) in the US tested observations from about 1,939 
corporations between the years of 1996 to 2003. With help of an ordinary minimum 
squares model, their research established that boards that are more gender diversified 
devote extra effort towards monitoring managers. More so, there exists a negative 
association between companies’ performance and the proportion of women on the board. 
 
Also, there are studies that established a lack of evidence of a relationship between 
gender diversity in the board and firm’s financial performance. For instance, in the US 
Carter et al. (2010) sampled 2,300 companies’ years among the 500 S&P indices over a 
five-year period between 1998 to 2002 to establish the link between the number of 
women directors in the board, the board’s proportion of ethnic minority, fiscal 
performance and important board committees. The research established that there existed 
no major association between the ethnic or gender diversity of the board on financial 
performance of important board committees. 
 
Based on Denmark and Netherland’s evidence, Marinova et al. (2010) sought to assess 
the effect of the board’s gender diversity on corporation’s financial performance with a 
sample size of 186 listed firms (84 Danish and 102 Dutch companies). The study applied 
a two-stage least-squares estimation method. The findings revealed that the issue of 
gender diversity had no impact on companies’ financial performance. Using cross-
sectional time-series models for assessing if female directors’ presence in the board could 
impact a firm’s stock and profit performance among US major corporations, Dobbin and 
Jung (2011) found that firms with more women as board of directors are likely not to 
experience any decrease or increase in profits. Equally, a study by Haslam et al. (2010) 
from the United Kingdom indicated no significant association between the presence of 
women in the boards and financial performance of the companies. The research measured 
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financial performance using return on equity and return on assets as the financial 
performance indicators. 
 
Mboya and Ekadah (2012) assessed the influence of board’s gender diversity on the 
corporate financial performance of commercial banks in Kenya using 32 commercial 
banks as the sample size. With the use of stepwise regression, the authors established no 
direct effect on financial performance of the board’s gender diversity among banks in 
Kenya. The current study was different from the study by Ekadah and Mboya (2012) in 
three ways. First, the study by Ekadah and Mboya was conducted using data from 1998 
to 2009 when women representation in corporate boards was very low. Currently, women 
representation in corporate boards stands at 12% compared to 4% and below before 2010. 
This study therefore has shed more light on the linkage between women representation at 
the boards and corporate financial performance. Secondly, the study by Ekadah and 
Mboya applied the less robust stepwise regression model which is less suitable for data in 
panel form. The current study will apply panel regression model. Lastly, the study by 
Ekadah and Mboya applied loan to total deposits ratio (LODP), board size (BoS), age of 
the bank (Bage), bank size (BS), net interest to total asset ratio (NIMTA), loan to asset 
ratio (LA) and listing status of the bank (Lstatus) as the control variables. This study 
included bank size and board size as the control variables. These have been indicated in 
various studies to influence performance. Moreover, the study included age and 
nationality diversity rather than just focusing on gender diversity.  
 
2.3.2 Board nationality diversity and financial performance 
Aosa’s (2012) study identified the connection between board’s nationality from other 
board’s indicators of diversity and the firm’s financial performance with a focus on the 
firms listed at the NSE. The research recognized no significant effect of the board’s 
nationality diversity on the firms’ financial performance of those firms listed at the NSE. 
Data from the boards’ age amongst other characteristics of interest as well as the 
companies’ historical financial performance were acquired from 40 firms using 
questionnaires that were structured. With use of OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) 
regression, the findings indicated an insignificant positive relationship between the 
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corporations’ fiscal performance and board’s nationality diversity. Generally, the findings 
indicated a statistically insignificant impact of board’s nationality diversity on the firm 
financial performance. The findings nevertheless, did not correspond with the resource 
dependency and agency theories of corporate governance. 
 
Randoy (2006) reviewed 500 of the largest companies in Denmark, Sweden, and Norway 
and established that there was no extensive effect of age diversity on return on assets or 
stock market performance. Gregory-Smith (2013) in the UK, established no evidence to 
support the hypothesis that diversity in age improves corporate performance. In 
Indonesia, Darmadi (2010) investigated the effect of the board’s diversity on a 
company’s performance by focusing on firms listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange 
(IDX). The study applied three indicators including nationality diversity. A sample of 169 
firms was used and data for one year (2009) was applied. This study established that 
nationality diversity had a significant positive impact on companies’ performance. 
 
Salim Darmadi (2011) examined the relationship between board members’ diversity and 
the performance of firms listed on the IDX (Indonesia Stock Exchange). Three 
demographic traits of board members such as nationality were analyzed as diversity 
measures. A sample size of 169 listed companies was used. Diversity in nationality was 
established to have insignificant influence on companies’ performances.  
 
Rodrigues (2014) conducted a study on the companies listed on the S&P 500 between the 
years 2000 and 2012 to assess the association between board nationality diversity and 
firm performance. The study included 358 firms and applied regression analysis. The 
study applied data that was collected for every two years on the number of nationalities in 
the board. In the study, nationality was measured using the number of different 
nationalities in the board while firm performance was measured using ROA and Tobin’s 
Q. The study findings established that nationality diversity had a significant positive 





2.3.3 Board’s age diversity and financial performance 
Aosa (2012) assessed the association between corporate financial performance and board 
diversity among companies listed at the NSE. Data regarding the boards’ age and other 
board characteristics and the financial performance of the participating firms was 
acquired from 40 firms using structured questionnaire. With help of an OLS regression, 
the findings indicated there was an insignificant positive linkage between financial 
performance and the board’s age diversity. Generally, the findings indicated a statistically 
insignificant impact of the board’s age diversity on financial performance. The findings 
did not correspond with the resource and agency dependency theories on corporate 
governance including similar empirical studies.  
 
Research by Salim Darmadi (2011) found that a percentage of young board members is 
positively linked to market performance, supporting the theory that having youthful 
people in boardrooms is associated with enhanced financial performance. Similarly, in 
Indonesia, using a cross-sectional time-series, Prihatiningtias (2012) aimed to find the 
effect of youthful members’ presence in the boardroom on the company’s social, 
financial and environmental performance. His research findings indicated a positive 
influence of age diversity on fiscal performance. More so, the findings from the 
qualitative method demonstrated that youthful board members have the capacity to 
initiate actions with a positive effect on corporations that could then boost the firm’s 
performance in general. Such study results correspond with the Darmadi (2010) findings 
that established the existence of high proportion of youthful members was extensively 
and positively linked with financial performance. 
 
There are studies which has established negative association between board age diversity 
and financial performance. Oxelheim and Randøy (2003) conducted a research to 
establish the traits of the Turkish banking industry’s boards of directors and to assess the 
impact of board’s diversity on banks’ performance. The study applied panel data 
modelling to assess the effect of the board’s diversity, as indicated by the percentage of 
young directors in the board, on the firm’s financial performance. The study’s findings 
indicated a negative correlation between financial performance and board age diversity. 
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Thus, the results do not support the case of having more youthful directors in the board to 
enhance the economic performance of the firm. The research establishes extra evidence 
to the limited empirical literature on the association between financial performance and 
board age diversity in the context of emerging markets. Moreover, most recent studies on 
the association between corporate financial performance and board age diversity have 
omitted financial companies from their samples.  
 
2.4 Summary of literature review 
The composition of the board subsumes individual director’s capability to handle the 
several tasks (Daily, Johnson and Dalton, 1999) and thus has generally been assessed by 
analyzing the board’s demographic traits (Rindova, 1999). Board size and composition 
have been regarded for long as vital governance process components for companies in 
business since it defines each director’s affiliation as either outside or inside board 
member (Lawrence and Stapledon, 1999; Boone et al, 2007; Tricker, 2009). They provide 
vital support in the firms’ performance. 
 
Previous corporate restructuring processes encourage female members’ participation in 
corporate governance undertakings. The objective is to enhance the board’s gender 
diversity. Companies have been coerced by institutional shareholders, investors, and 
interest groups to nominate directors with distinct gender and ethnic backgrounds and 
bases of age and expertise differences at their boards (Van der Walt et al., 2006). The 
prevailing assumption is that extensive diversity would lead to reduced inward-looking 
decision-making processes with a greater forward-looking capacity (Westphal and 
Fredrickson, 2001; Bathula, 2008). Similarly, Bilimoria (1994) reasoned that executive 
women bring well-informed and fresh views related with environment, market and ethical 
issues that have an effect on the corporation’s decision-making process. He also reasoned 
that boards that have more than one female director deliver a greater positive impact 
through strategic decisions. Hence, the diversity of the board of directors, either viewed 





Existing literature shows a correlation between corporate governance, mostly corporate 
performance and board’s diversity (Fan, 2012; Haslam et al., 2010; Julizaerma and Sori, 
2012). Nevertheless, some research gaps have yet to be sufficiently addressed. It is well 
argued and documented in literature that board members have the potential to influence 
organizations’ financial performance. However, some researches have been conducted to 
assess if this could influence non-financial performance measures (such as employees 
retention, innovation, and customer satisfaction). More so, research on the board’s gender 
diversity is largely drawn and conducted in developed nations that are distinct in their 
socio-cultural and economic structure from what is the case in developing world. Gender 
diversity literature in developing nations is scarce and limited. The study’s findings 
among developed countries could not be generalized and applied across international 
boundaries because of the difference in culture and regulatory environment. 
 
Additionally, the few researches done among developing nations are limited by 
methodological limitations like the use of few years of secondary data and case studies. 
More studies should hence be conducted using either panel, primary or survey data to 
enhance the results and provide an understanding that provides deeper insight on the 
association between the financial performance of companies and gender diversity. 
Similarly, most previous researches are only limited to companies listed on the securities 
exchange, therefore excluding insights into other economic segments that form the bulk 
of businesses that are formal. This raises sample bias issues. Finally, while there is 
substantial literature highlighting the influence of board’s gender diversity on a firm’s 
financial performance, prevailing literature does not illustrate a definite relationship 
between the board’s firm performance and gender diversity variable. 
 
Empirical evidence regarding the linkage between a firm’s performance and board 
diversity is inconclusive and equivocal with previous research generating conflicting 
findings. Experimental evidence relating the association between firm performance and 
board diversity reported conflicting and mixed findings. Moreover, most studies focus on 
gender diversity and few have focused on age and nationality diversity. Previous studies 
also observed no relationship (Ekadah & Mboya, 2012; Haslam et al., 2010). Additional 
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researches underline either a negative (Fan, 2012; Julizaerma and Sori, 2012) or positive 
relationship (Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira, 2009; Bohren and Strom, 2006; Haslam et 
al., 2010) between firm performance and board diversity. Hence, the association between 
corporate financial performance and board diversity is inconclusive and hence still open 
for more empirical enquiry. 
 
2.5 Combined Indicator of Board Diversity 
The study aimed to assess the role of combined board diversity on financial performance 
of commercial banks in Kenya. This study measured board diversity as a score that 
combines the three board diversity indicators (age, gender and nationality). Gender 
diversity was measured in the study using the percentage of female directors in the board 
(number of women in board/board size). Board size is a measure that indicates the sum 
number of directors at the board. Age diversity was measured using the proportion of 
members less than 50 years. This is informed by the fact that most boards include elderly 
directors who are perceived to have the experience and skills required to steer the 
company (Darmadi, 2010). Nationality diversity was indicated by the proportion of 
foreign directors in the board (foreign directors in the board/board size).  
 
The combined indicator of board diversity was a measure that combined the three 
diversity factors. This therefore provided a single score of the diversity measure of the 
banks. Combined indicator of board diversity is therefore a joint measure of gender, age 
and nationality diversity (Gender diversity + Gender diversity + Nationality diversity). 
 
2.6 Research gap 
Empirical investigations on the influence of board diversity on corporate financial is 
inconclusive where the results of the various studies are dependent highly on the 
methodology applied and the context of the study. The studies reviewed indicate mixed 
results which can be due to the different time periods used, the differing economic 
environments, the diversity of countries included in the studies and the different measures 
used to assess diversity and financial performance. The current study applied the most 
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recent data (2012-2016) to incorporate the recent developments in diversity as many 
banks had recently welcomed the issue of board diversity.  
 
Most companies in the world are welcoming the idea that board diversity is critical for 
corporate governance and firm performance. However, the various studies showing 
positive effect (Rodrigues, 2014), negative effect (Darmadi, 2010) and neutral effect 
(Ekadah & Mboya, 2012) of the board’s diversity on corporate financial performance 
raised serious questions regarding the value of board diversity in the firm. However, most 
of these studies measure board diversity with the many underlying factors such as age, 
gender, nationality, and ethnicity but do not have a single measure of diversity that 
incorporates the various diversity aspects. This study provided a single measure of 
diversity that combined the various diversity measures.  
 
2.5 Conceptual framework 
According to Shields and Rangarajan (2013), conceptual framework is an analytical 
instrument with some variations and contexts used to make distinctions and organize 
ideas in a meaningful yet simplified way. The conceptual framework thus provides a way 
of understanding how board diversity impacts the performance of Kenyan commercial 
banks. The conceptual framework that guided the research is presented in Figure 2.1. 
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Figure 2.1: Conceptual framework on board diversity  
        
  
  






Source: Author (2017) 
 
Combined measure of board diversity (age, nationality and gender diversity) was treated 
as the independent variable. Combined measure of board diversity was measured as an 
additive variable that combined age, nationality and gender diversity. This enabled the 
study to provide a single score of diversity that incorporated many diversity aspects and 
thus provided more robust findings on how the various diversity measures in the board 
can jointly influence financial performance.  
 
The control variables in the study were bank size, board size, capital adequacy, asset 
quality and deposit level. These were included in the study as they had been indicated to 
be instrumental in influencing bank financial performance. Bank size was measured using 
the book value of assets owned by the bank. Board size was measured using the number 
of directors in the board. Capital adequacy is a ratio of Tier I and II capital to the risk 
weighted assets. Other control variables used include asset quality and deposit level. The 
dependent variable was the firm’s financial performance measured using ROA and 
Tobin’s Q.  
 
Quality of Board Diversity 
• Age Diversity 
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• Bank size 
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• Capital adequacy 
• Asset Quality, 
• Deposit Level 
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2.6 Operationalization of Variables 
The variables and their measurement are depicted in Table 2.1. The variables that were 
included in the study include gender diversity, age diversity, nationality diversity, 
combined measure of board diversity, ROA and Tobin’s Q. How the variables were 
operationalized is presented in Table 2.1.  
Table 2.1: Measurement of Variables 







 Ratio Number of female members 
/ board size 
Age diversity Independent Ratio Number of board members < 
50 years / board size 
Nationality 
diversity 
Independent Ratio Number of foreign nationals 





Independent Ratio Addition of the three 
diversity indicators 
ROA Dependent  Ratio Net profit after tax / value of 
assets 
Tobin’s Q  Dependent Ratio Market value of assets / 






This chapter provides an overview for the research data collection methods that were 
used, the research methodology applied, and the data analysis methods utilized. 
Moreover, the chapter provides the study population that was used in the study and in 
generating the findings and conclusions thereof. 
 
3.2 Research Design 
This research was causal since it attempted to analyze the relationship between 
commercial banks’ board diversity and financial performance. Additionally, the study 
was explanatory in nature as it sought to establish whether the characteristics including 
gender, age and nationality had any effect on financial performance of commercial banks. 
The effect of banks’ diversity on performance was analyzed over a five-year period from 
2012 to 2016. The period was selected to enable a long enough period but also to ensure 
that data collected was current. Because a board typically has a six years’ lifespan, it may 
follow then that the entire board could have been constituted or changed. 
 
3.3 Population and Sampling 
The population targeted for this research was all the operational commercial banks in 
Kenya by December 2016. These banks were forty-two (42) in number based on the CBK 
(Central Bank of Kenya) 2017 Banking Supervision Report. However, since some banks 
were in statutory management and others were in receivership, only 38 commercial banks 
were included in the study. All these banks were studied since a whole and conclusive 
representative analysis was required.  
 
3.4 Data Collection methods 
The relevant data for this research was derived from secondary sources. The operational 
and financial data for commercial banks is readily available from various secondary 
sources. The data for this study was derived from secondary sources such as audited 
annual accounts of the commercial banks and the CBK bank supervision reports.  
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3.5 Data Analysis  
Panel regression analysis was used to establish the correlation between firm’s 
performance and board diversity. Panel regression analysis was also utilized to assess the 
relationship among variables mostly the extent to which a variable that is dependent is a 
function of either several or one independent variable (Saunders et al., 2007; Hair et al., 
1998). Descriptive statistics were exploited to provide a description of targeted firms’ 
board of directors’ characteristics and financial performance.  
 
Panel regression model was used to evaluate quantitative data gathered in this research. It 
was utilized because it is a common and versatile model exploited by many researchers. 
Similarly, panel regression was used to explore the relationship among variables, since it 
not only indicates negative, positive, or no relationship but also underlines the strength of 
such relationship (Jonson & Kuby, 2007). Moreover, it was used because it was 
anticipated that there would be some relationship among certain independent variables. 
 
A unit of analysis for bank financial year was applied in examining the influence of the 
board’s diversity on corporation’s financial performance. Five bank-year records for each 
bank were utilized where the panel regression model (random-effects and fixed effects 
models) was considered to test the study hypotheses. However, the pooled regression 
model could be viable because it corrects omitted variables’ biasness, and the presence of 
heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation in pooled data. The methodology allows the 
examiner to assess variations from cross-sectional units simultaneously using variations 
among individual units from time to time (Bathula, 2008).  
 
A valuable assumption for selecting the random-effect estimation is such that the 
overlooked heterogeneity shall not be associated with independent variables. Before 
proceeding with regression analyses, the research variables should be gauged for multi-
collinearity in line with established procedure (Hair et al., 1998). The methodology was 
viable for the research since it entailed the board diversity attributes as an independent 




In this research, the researcher conducted a cross-sectional regression assessment to 
assess the extent of which the board’s diversity impacts on the firm’s financial 
performance. Putting into consideration control and explanatory variables which could 
affect corporate financial performance. The study adopted two models. The first model 
was used to analyse data for the first three specific objectives and it was as follows; 
PERFit = GDit + ADit NDit + BSit + BdSit + CAit + AQit + DLit + αi + uit …………. (i) 
Where  
PERF is fiscal performance that is valued by the ROA and Tobin’s Q 
GD is gender diversity 
AD is age diversity 
ND is nationality diversity 
BS is the bank’s size valued as the log of assets 
BdS is board size 
CA is Capital adequacy 
AQ is Asset Quality, 
DL is Deposit Level 
αi (i=1….38) intercept for each entity. 
uit is the error term 
 
the second model was used to analyze data for the fourth objective and it was as follows: 




PERF is fiscal performance that is valued by the ROA and Tobin’s Q 
BD is board diversity measured as a product of the women’s proportion, foreign 
nationals and board members’ proportion less than 50 years  
BS is the bank’s size valued as the log of assets 
BdS is board size 
CA is Capital adequacy 
AQ is Asset Quality, 
DL is Deposit Level 
αi (i=1….38) intercept for each entity. 
uit is the error term 
ROA was derived from the CBK’s supervision reports for banking for 2012 – 2016 that 
defines it in the company’s net income’s ratio to its value of assets book value. 
3.6 Data Quality 
The research conducted was quality as it only considered data from audited and published 
financial statements from commercial banks and the published reports from CBK. 
Reliability of the data was checked through comparing data collected from audited 
financial statements of the commercial banks and the data available from bank 
supervision reports of the CBK. This ensured that reliable information was included in 
the study hence providing credibility to the findings.  
3.7 Ethical Issues 
Based on Mugenda and Mugenda, (2003), considerations of ethics is critical for any 
study. Ethical concerns were put into consideration plus the proper researcher’s conduct 
and result reliability and authenticity. Since the data collected was available publicly, the 
only ethical issue of concern was authenticity and truthfulness of the findings. The 






PRESENTATION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS - ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
4.1 Introduction  
The chapter presents the steps that were taken in analyzing the data, the results and the 
discussion of the results. First, the chapter presents the exploratory analysis where visual 
plots for return on assets which was the dependent variable are provided. Moreover, the 
chapter also presents the pre-analysis diagnostic tests and the post-test diagnostic tests. 
The model that was applied in analysis is also presented where the results are interpreted 
and discussed. The analysis relates to data of the 38 commercial banks that had complete 
data for the five years. This was done to ensure that the data analysis was performed with 
a balanced panel.  
 
4.2 Sample Representation 
The study was a census of the 42 commercial banks in Kenya. However, 38 commercial 
banks had complete data for the five years (2012 – 2016). Four commercial banks lacked 
data for either the entire period or a part of the study period. Charterhouse bank was 
under statutory management for the entire study period, Chase and Imperial Banks were 
placed under receivership during the study period, while Mayfair bank was licensed in 
2017. The 38 commercial banks had data for the entire five years and this provided the 
study with a balanced panel. The 38 commercial banks represented 90% of the targeted 
42 commercial banks.  
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4.3 Diagnostic Tests 
The study conducted diagnostic tests that are required before model fitting. These 
diagnostic tests are important before any regression is conducted to ensure that the data 
fits the regression assumptions. The diagnostic tests started with the test of collinearity 
among the variables using Variance Inflation Factors (VIF). Results are presented in 
Table 4.1. These results indicated that there was no multicollinearity as no variable had 
VIF of above 5. Creswell (2013) notes that when VIF is below 10, that indicates no 
multicollinearity. 
Table 4.1: Variance Inflation Factors 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Deposit level 2.79 0.358 
Capital Adequacy Ratio 2.79 0.396 
Asset Quality 1.19 0.842 
Nationality Diversity 1.16 0.863 
Gender Diversity 1.14 0.878 
Age Diversity 1.04 0.965 
Mean VIF 1.64  
 
 
To test for serial correlation, the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data was 
applied which has the null hypothesis of no first order serial correlation. Results are 
presented in Table 4.2. The results indicate that there was no first order serial correlation 
(F = 1.6870 p > 0.05).  
Table 4.2: Test for Serial Correlation 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
Ho: No first order autocorrelation 
F (1, 37) 1.687 






After the selected panel regression model was run post estimation diagnostics were 
conducted to establish whether the model was a good fit. First, the test of 
homoscedasticity was conducted using the white test. The results are presented in Table 
4.3. The results indicate that the null hypothesis for homoscedasticity could not be 
rejected (chi square = 15.56; p > 0.05). This indicated that the residuals had equal 
variances.  
Table 4.3: Tests for Homoscedasticity 
White’s test for Ho: Homoscedasticity 
              against Ha: unrestricted heteroscedasticity 
 
Chi2 (13)      = 15.56 
Prob > Chi2  = 0.744 
 
Cameron & Trivedi decomposition of IM-test 
Source Chi2 df p 
Heteroscedasticity 15.56 13 0.744 
Skewness 3.56 5 0.615 
Kurtosis 2.74 1 0.098 
Total 21.86 19 0.697 
 
The test for the normality of residuals was graphically tested using the Normality QQ 
plots for residuals. The results are presented in Figure 4.1 which indicates that the 




Figure 4.1: Normal QQ plot for residuals 
 
Test of normality of residuals was conducted using the overlay of k density curve over 
the normal curve. The k density curve is derived from estimating the residuals after 
running the fixed effects model and then plotting a curve. The results are indicated in 
Figure 8 which were used to conclude that the residuals were normally distributed as the 



















kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.0649
Kernel density estimate
 
Figure 4.2: Test of Normality of Residuals 
 
After the post tests, it was established that the panel regression model could be fitted. A 
Hausman test was conducted to establish the right panel data model (fixed or random) to 
fit to the data. The results presented in Table 4.4 indicate that the chi square was 5.13 and 
was not significant at 5% (p = 0.528). This hence implies that a random effects model is 
appropriate for the data.   
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Table 4.4: Hausman Test 
Hausman fixed random 










Asset quality -3.304 -3.022 -0.282 0.120 
Capital Adequacy 3.681 3.259 0.423 - 
Deposit level 0.006 0.008 -0.002 - 
Board Size -0.667 -0.604 -0.063 0.008 
Bank size 0.805 -0.2242 1.047 0.746 
Board Diversity 1.642 -0.368 2.010 1.613 
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
 
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic 
Chi2 = (b-B) [(v_b – v_B) ^ (-1)] (b-B) 
        = 5.13 
 
Prob > Chi2  = 0.528 
 
 
4.4 Descriptive Analysis  
The study conducted exploratory data analysis with the aim of comparing the trends of 
ROA and Tobin’s Q for all the commercial banks that were included in the study. The 
exploratory analysis was important to establish whether there were significant differences 
between the commercial within the five-year period. This output helps determine whether 
to use POLS or panel data models. The results for the growth plots of ROA are presented 
in Appendix III. These results revealed that there were not many variations in the 
commercial banks except in bank 14, 15, 25, 26, 28, 36 and 37. The other commercial 
banks showed ROA that was not changing much over the five years. This data showed 
that though there were no major differences amongst the banks based on the ROA, there 




Further, growth plots for Tobin’s Q were plotted and the results are presented in 
Appendix IV. The results revealed that there were not many variations based on the 
Tobin’s Q of the commercial banks except in bank 8, 9, 10 and 14. The other commercial 
banks showed Tobin’s Q which did not fluctuate much over the study period of five 
years.  
The study also provided the overlain plots for all the commercial banks that 
showed the differences among the commercial banks in terms of the two dependent 
variables (ROA and Tobin’s Q). The results are presented in Figure 4.2 and 4.3.  Results 
in Figure 4.2 present the overlain plots for ROA. This indicated that the intercepts for the 
different commercial banks may not be materially different apart from two commercial 
banks which indicated significant differences from the others. Since the basic model 
assumes that the intercept is the same for all firms, this was indicated to apply for this 
data. The overlain plot in Figure 4.3 also indicated that there seemed to be no time related 
fixed effects as most of the plots seemed to move in the same direction. Moreover, most 
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Figure 4.2: Overlain Plots of ROA 
 
The overlain plots for Tobin’s Q was also plotted. Figure 4.3 indicates that there was a 
general rise in Tobi ’s Q for the banks from 2012 to 2015. However, these seemed to be 
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Figure 4.3: Overlain Plots of Tobin’s Q  
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The study further generated descriptive statistics for the panel data and the results are as 
presented in Table 4.5. Study results provided the mean of the independent, control and 
dependent variables. The mean of board diversity measure was 0.57. This indicated very 
low diversity as this was a combined measure of three different indicators of diversity 
(age, gender and nationality. Mean of board size was 9.11 indicating that most boards of 
commercial banks had an average of approximately nine members. Mean of Tobin’s Q 
was 6.399 which implied that the commercial banks had enabled to increase their market 
value of assets to more than six times their book value. Mean of capital adequacy was 
0.144 indicating that the commercial banks had higher capital adequacy than the statutory 
8 percent. Further, the mean for ROA was 3.925% indicating that on average, the 
commercial banks had reported good financial performance over the five-year period.  
Table 4.5: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean 
Board diversity 0.565 
Board size 9.111 
Nationality diversity 0.115 
Age diversity 0.241 
Tobin’s Q 6.400 
Deposit level 7.146 
Capital Adequacy ratio 0.144 
Asset quality 0.098 
Bank size 7.318 
ROA 3.925 
 
4.5 Bivariate analysis 
The study also conducted a test to investigate the relationship between the variables 
under study. A correlation matrix is presented in Table 4.6 where the results indicate that 
there was a strong relationship between capital adequacy ratio and deposit level (r = 
0.743).  Results also indicate that there was moderate linear association between capital 
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adequacy ratio and gender diversity (r = 0.311), between asset quality and deposit level (r 
= 0.328). The other variables had weak relationships between them. Negative association 
was established between age diversity and nationality diversity (r = -0.082) though the 
relationship was very weak.  
Table 4.6: Correlation Matrix 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Gender Diversity 1.000      
2. Nationality Diversity 0.168 1.000     
3. Age diversity 0.119 -0.082 1.000    
4. Deposit level 0.236 0.312 0.018 1.000   
5. Capital Adequacy ratio 0.311 0.158    0.099 0.743 1.000  
6. Asset quality 0.071 0.193 0.018 0.328 0.104 1.000 
 
4.6 Panel Regression  
The results of the developed random effects model are then presented in Table 4.6. In the 
model the independent variables were age diversity, gender diversity and nationality 
diversity. The control variables were bank’s size, board size, capital adequacy, asset 
quality and deposit level. Study results in Table 4.7 indicated that the model was 
statistically significant (χ2 = 38.81; p < 0.05). This indicates that the board diversity and 
the control variables that had been included in the model could provide important 
predictive power on financial performance of the commercial banks.  The within r 
squared of the model was 23.78 percent indicating that the model explained 23.78% of 
the variation in financial performance within the 38 commercial banks. This r squared 
was justifiably low because there were various other factors which significantly influence 
financial performance including management efficiency, working capital management, 
employee efficiency and use of technology. The between r-squared was 1.2 percent while 
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the overall r squared was 9.1 percent. This indicates that the model was better at 
explaining the variations within the commercial banks than if the data was pooled.  
 
Table 4.7: Random Effects Model on ROA 
Random effects GLS regression Number of observations =      190 
Group variable: Bank Number of groups           =       38 
R-Sq     Within      = 0.238 
              Between  = 0.012 
              Overall    = 0.091 
Corr (u_i, x)          = 0 (assumed) 
Observations per group   =       5 
Wald Chi2 (8)          =     38.81 
Prob >    Chi2          =     0.000       
Return on assets  Coefficient Std. Error       z    p > z     
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Gender diversity 1.326 2.737 0.48 0.628 -4.039 6.690 
Nationality diversity -5.072 3.009 -1.69 0.092 -10.969 0.825 
Age diversity 1.539 2.481 0.62 0.535 -3.324 6.401 
Bank size 0.245 0.241 0.93 0.351 -0.697 0.247 
Board size -0.615 0.221 -2.78 0.005 -1.048 -0.182 
Capital adequacy 3.514 0.915 3.84 0.000 1.721 5.307 
Asset Quality -3.039 1.269 -2.39 0.017 -5.526 -0.552 
Deposit level 0.003 0.079 0.04 0.969 -0.152 0.159 
Constant 9.453 2.500 3.78 0.000 4.552 14.354 
 
The first objective of the study was to establish the effect of gender diversity on financial 
performance of commercial banks in Kenya. Study results in Table 4.7 indicate that 
gender diversity (β = 1.326; p = 0.628) did not have any significant effect on financial 
performance of commercial banks. 
 
The second objective of the study was to establish the effect of nationality diversity on 
financial performance of commercial banks in Kenya. Study results in Table 4.7 indicate 
that nationality diversity (β = -5.072; p = 0.092) did not have any significant effect on 
financial performance of commercial banks. 
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The third objective of the study was to establish the effect of age diversity on financial 
performance of commercial banks in Kenya. Study results in Table 4.7 indicate that age 
diversity (β = 1.539; p = 0.535) did not have any significant effect on financial 
performance of commercial banks.  
 
Similarly, bank size (β = 0.225; p = 0.351), and deposit level (β = 0.0031; p = 0.969) did 
not have a significant effect on financial performance. However, capital adequacy (β = 
3.514; p = 0.000) had a positive effect on ROA. Further, board size (β = -0.615; p = 
0.005) and asset quality (β = -3.039; p = 0.017) had a significant negative effect on 
financial performance (ROA) of commercial banks.  
 
The study conducted a random effects panel regression of the independent variables 
without the control variables. The findings presented in Table 4.8 indicate that neither 
gender diversity (β = 0.918; p = 0.942), nationality diversity (β = -4.16; p = 0.185) nor 
age diversity (β = -0.058; p = 0.982) had a significant effect on financial performance of 
commercial banks.  
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Table 4.8: Random Effects Model Without Control Variables 
Random effects GLS regression Number of observations =      190 
Group variable: Bank Number of groups           =       38 
R-Sq     Within      = 0.0001 
              Between  = 0.0668 
              Overall    = 0.0328 
Corr (u_i, x)          = 0 (assumed) 
Observations per group   =       5 
Wald Chi2 (8)          =     1.77 
Prob >    Chi2          =     0.6215      
Return on assets  Coefficient Std. Error       z    p > z     
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Gender diversity 0.198 2.733 0.07 0.942 -5.158 5.555 
Nationality diversity -4.160 3.137 -1.33 0.185 -10.308 1.989 
Age diversity -0.058 2.618 -0.02 0.982 -5.189 5.072 
Constant 4.377 1.025 4.27 0.000 2.369 6.385 
 
The study also run a model with Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable. Study results in 
Table 4.8 indicated that the model was statistically significant (χ2 = 90.80; p < 0.000). 
This indicates that the board diversity and the control variables that had been included in 
the model could provide important explanatory power towards financial performance of 
the commercial banks. The within r squared of the model was 37.17 percent indicating 
that the model explained 37.17% of the variation in financial performance within the 38 
commercial banks. The between r-squared was 13.38 percent while the overall r squared 
was 16.37 percent. This indicates that the panel model was better in explaining the 
variations within the commercial banks than the pooled OLS model. 
 
Moreover, the study results presented in Table 4.9 indicate that gender diversity (β = 





Nationality diversity (β = -1.277; p = 0.576) did not have any significant effect on 
financial performance of commercial banks. 
 
Age diversity (β = 0.964; p = 0.466) did not have any significant effect on financial 
performance of commercial banks.  
 
Similarly, bank size (β = 0.2278; p = 0.272) and deposit level (β = 0.0153; p = 0.676) did 
not have a significant effect on financial performance. However, capital adequacy (β = 
3.6960; p = 0.000) had a significant positive effect while board size (β = -0.251; p = 
0.015) had a significant negative effect on financial performance (Tobin’s Q) of 
commercial banks. Further, asset quality (β = -1.412; p = 0.018) had a significant 
negative effect on financial performance (Tobin’s Q).  
Table 4.9: Random Effects Model on Tobin’s Q 
Random effects GLS regression Number of observations =      190 
Group variable: Bank Number of groups           =       38 
R-Sq     Within      = 0.372 
              Between  = 0.134 
              Overall    = 0.164 
Corr (u_i, x)          = 0 (assumed) 
Observations per group   =       5 
Wald Chi2 (8)          =     90.80 
Prob >    Chi2          =     0.000       
Tobin’s Q  Coefficient Std. Error       z      p > z     
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Gender diversity 1.297 1.506 0.86 0.389 -1.654 4.248 
Nationality diversity -1.257 2.248 -0.56 0.576 -5.664 3.149 
Age diversity 0.964 1.322 0.73 0.466 -1.627 3.555 
Bank size 0.223 0.203 1.10 0.272 -0.620 0.175 
Board size -0.251 0.104 -2.42 0.015 -0.454 -0.048 
Capital adequacy 3.696 0.417 8.86 0.000 1.454 5.307 
Asset Quality -1.412 0.595 -2.38 0.018 -4.281 -2.878 
Deposit level 0.015 0.037 0.42 0.676 -0.056 0.087 




Further, the study sought to establish the effect of the combined board diversity on 
financial performance of commercial banks. First, the model was run with ROA as the 
dependent variable. The results are presented in Table 4.10. The study findings indicate 
that board diversity (β = -.368; p = 0.825) had no significant effect on financial 
performance (ROA) of commercial banks.  
 
Table 4.10: Random Effects Model of Board Diversity on ROA 
Random effects GLS regression Number of observations =      190 
Group variable: Bank Number of groups           =       38 
R-Sq     Within      = 0.219 
              Between  = 0.000 
              Overall    = 0.073 
Corr (u_i, x)          = 0 (assumed) 
Observations per group   =       5 
Wald Chi2 (6)          =     34.22 
Prob >    Chi2          =     0.000       
Return on assets  Coefficient Std. Error       z    p > z     
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Board diversity -1.368 1.663 -0.22 0.825 -3.627 6.690 
Bank size 0.242 0.235 1.03 0.304 0.703 2.329 
Board size -0.604 0.223 -2.71 0.007 -1.041 -0.168 
Capital adequacy 3.259 0.915 3.56 0.000 1.465 5.052 
Asset Quality -3.022 1.276 -2.37 0.018 -5.522 -0.522 
Deposit level 0.008 0.080 0.10 0.923 -0.149 0.165 
Constant 9.904 2.471 4.01 0.000 5.061 14.747 
 
Lastly, the study assessed the effect of combined board diversity on finance performance 
of commercial banks measured through Tobin’s. Study findings in Table 4.10 indicate 
that board diversity (BD) did not have a significant effect on Tobin’s Q of the 
commercial banks (β = 0.703; p = 0.473).  
Table 4.10: Random Effects Model of Board Diversity on Tobin’s Q 
Random effects GLS regression Number of observations =      190 
Group variable: Bank Number of groups           =       38 
R-Sq     Within      = 0.371 Observations per group   =       5 
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              Between  = 0.107 
              Overall    = 0.146 
Corr (u_i, x)          = 0 (assumed) 
Wald Chi2 (6)          =     89.84 
Prob >    Chi2          =     0.000       
Tobin’s Q  Coefficient Std. Error       z    p > z     
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Board diversity 0.703 0.980 0.72 0.473 -1.217 2.623 
Bank size 0.253 0.198 1.28 0.201 -0.641 1.134 
Board size -0.244 0.103 -2.36 0.018 -0.441 -0.041 
Capital adequacy 3.761 0.410 9.17 0.000 1.362 4.329 
Asset Quality -1.444 0.591 -2.44 0.015 -3.871 1.212 
Deposit level 0.014 0.037 0.39 0.697 -2.176 0.324 






DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Introduction  
Presented in this chapter is a summary of the research findings, discussion of the results, 
conclusion and the recommendations that are made in the study. The summary of the 
findings provides the major results that were derived from the study and offers a 
discussion of these key findings. The discussion is also provided in relation to the 
theories and previous empirical studies on board diversity and financial performance.  
 
5.2 Discussion of Findings  
5.2.1 Age Diversity and Financial Performance 
The study results indicated that board age diversity (AD) did not have a significant effect 
on financial performance measured through ROA (β = 1.539; p = 0.535) and Tobin’s Q 
(β = 0.964; p = 0.466). These results indicated that the mix between young and elderly 
directors in the board does not have any significance on performance. These results 
support the findings by Bhatt and Bhattacharya (2015) and Gaur et al. (2015) that found 
insignificant positive relationship between age diversity and financial performance while 
the findings by Kumar and Singh (2013) established insignificant negative relationship 
between age diversity of the board and financial performance.  
 The results of the insignificant effect of age diversity on financial performance 
negate the proposition of the group diversity theory by Cox (1993). This theory advocates 
that inclusion of members with distinctly different age, cultural significance and group 
affiliations can enhance the group’s effectiveness. Similarly, this theory postulates that 
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when a group is made up of individuals from diverse backgrounds, that group becomes 
more effective than a group made up of individuals from similar backgrounds. This study 
established that having a board that is diverse in terms of age did not influence financial 
performance. The study results also concur with a study by Chen et al. (2015) in UK that 
there is no relationship between board age diversity and financial performance. The study 
results also support the findings by Marinova et al. (2010), Horvath and Spirollari (2013), 
and Ekadah and Mboya (2012) which all found insignificant effect of age diversity on 
financial performance.  
 The study results on the insignificant effect of age diversity on financial 
performance however contradicted findings by Nakano and Nguyen (2014) which 
established that board age had a significant negative effect on performance of the firm. 
The findings also contradict the findings by Abdullah and Ismail (2013) which 
established that age diversity was negatively associated with ROA.  
 
5.2.2 Gender Diversity and Financial Performance 
The study results indicated that gender diversity had insignificant effect on financial 
performance of the commercial banks in Kenya measured through both ROA (β = 1.326; 
p = 0.628) and Tobin’s Q (β = 1.297; p = 0.628). These findings indicate that having a 
board that is more diverse in relation to gender does not provide any short term 
observable financial performance benefits. These results supported the results from a 
study by Letting et al. (2012) which established that there was no significant effect 
between board gender diversity and financial performance. However, these results 
contradict the findings by Fan (2012) which indicated that financial performance of the 
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firms was induced by diversity of the boards in relation to factors such as gender, 
ethnicity and age.  
 
5.2.3 Nationality Diversity and Financial Performance 
The study results also indicated that nationality diversity was not significantly related 
with financial performance of the commercial banks as measured through both ROA (β = 
-5.072; p = 0.092) and Tobin’s Q (β = -1.277; p = 0.576). These results contradict the 
group diversity theory that implies that when the board has many nationalities, it will 
approach issues using different perspectives which may be beneficial for the firm. These 
findings agree with the findings by Kiel and Nicholson (2013) that there was no 
significant effect of nationality diversity in the board and performance of the 
organization. This was explained by Merendino (2014) to imply that when a company is 
working in a certain region, having board members from a different region rarely helps 
the firm since even global firms need to have localized perspectives. The finding also 
supports the findings by Salim Darmadi (2011) who examined the relationship between 
board members’ nationality diversity and the performance of firms listed in the IDX 
(Indonesia Stock Exchange). Three demographic traits of board members including 
nationality were analyzed as diversity proxies. A 169-sample size was used from 169 
listed companies and the findings established that diversity in nationality had 




5.2.4 Combined Board Diversity and Financial Performance 
Lastly, the study results revealed that board diversity (BD) did not have a significant 
effect on ROA (β = -.368; p = 0.825) as well as Tobin’s Q of the commercial banks (β = 
0.703; p = 0.825). The combined measure of board diversity focussed on age, gender and 
nationalities of the board members of the commercial bank. The findings imply that 
having a more diverse board in terms of age, gender and nationalities provides the firm 
no financial performance benefits. This finding supports the findings by Prihatiningtias 
(2012) which indicated that having more women, youthful members and foreign 
members in the board did not enable a firm to perform better than firms which had less 
diversified boards. This was explained to imply that though diversity can have beneficial 
aspects, it can also bring disadvantage to the board by increasing conflicts that are fuelled 
by the fundamental differences among the board members. For the board to harness its 
diversity as an asset, there needs to be strong leadership for the board to tap the different 
beneficial aspects from its individual members. This implies that diversity in itself does 
not bring benefits but there must be constructive effort to tap into the diversity dividend.  
 
5.3 Conclusion  
The study assessed the influence of board diversity on financial performance of 
commercial banks in Kenya. Board gender diversity, age diversity and nationality 
diversity size, and combined diversity score were the independent variables in the study 
while the dependent variable was financial performance which was measured using ROA 
and Tobin’s Q. The study findings led to the following conclusions. First, board age 




Secondly, gender diversity was not a significant factor in influencing financial 
performance in the commercial banks, while board nationality diversity did not also have 
a significant influence on financial performance of commercial banks. Lastly, the study 
concludes that combined board diversity did not have a significant effect on financial 
performance of commercial banks.  
 
5.4 Recommendations  
5.4.2 Policy Recommendations 
The study recommends to regulators and policy makers to consider the influence such 
recommendations would have on the overall financial performance and sustainability of 
the firm in passing any policy or regulations regarding board diversity. Further, they 
should ensure that any policy passed on board diversity has long-term sustainability and 
performance considerations for the firm. As it is portrayed by the findings in this study, 
there is no evidence in the Kenyan context that board diversity has any effect on financial 
performance. Though financial performance is not the only objective of the firm, it is the 
primary objective and hence should be carefully considered in any policy making. 
Policymakers should also engage in funding research in the field of board 
diversity and financial performance to ensure that when passing policy in the subject area 
of board diversity, they use evidence. Further, policy makers should investigate various 
studies on board diversity to establish the benefits and costs of board diversity to firms so 




5.4.2 Managerial Implications 
The recommendations made from these findings is that when selecting boards members, 
shareholders should consider having a board that is composed of members from different 
ethnic, cultural, gender and nationalities which is expected to provide a diverse view of 
issues. However, diversity should not only be considered for its own sake but should be 
considered on how well it will enhance the board leadership and control role in the firm.  
The study also recommends to the shareholders of companies to ensure that 
demographic diversity is informed by the interests of the companies not just for the sake 
of having a demographically diverse board. On size, firms should ensure a board of 
optimum size to enable it to effectively carry out its mandate. This can only be arrived at 
after careful consideration on what the activities of the boards in the commercial bank 
are. 
 
5.5 Limitations of the Study 
This study applied panel data regression to establish whether age, gender and nationality 
diversity has significant effect on financial performance of commercial banks. Moreover, 
the study showed originality by computing a combined score of board diversity by 
combining the three diversity measures into a single score. The study however, 
established that neither gender, nationality nor the combined diversity score had any 
significant effect on financial performance. However, the study findings may have the 
following limitations.  
First, though the study applied various control variables to reduce the effect of 
extraneous variables, there might be some other extraneous variables such as 
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management efficiency, liquidity levels, financial leverage and other such variables 
which were not controlled in the study.  
The study also noted that there was very little diversity on gender, age and 
nationality. Most of the commercial banks had less than 20% female representation in the 
board. This trend was also reflected in the low inclusion of young directors and directors 
from other nationalities other than Kenya. The lack of diversity in the boards of the 
commercial banks may hence not reflect in the financial performance as most of them 
had similar low levels of diversity.  
 
5.6 Suggestions for Further Research 
This study investigated the effect of gender, nationality and age diversity on the financial 
performance of commercial banks in Kenya. The study related board diversity in each 
year with financial performance of the same year. However, board diversity may have a 
lagged effect on financial performance such that the financial performance implications 
of a diverse board in the current year may be felt in two or three years. This is because 
some of the investments and strategies that a board implements may have returns not 
necessarily in the current year but in two or more years in the future. For future studies, a 
recommendation is provided that for future studies, lagged effect of board diversity on 
financial performance should be explored. Moreover, such future studies should also 
apply data for more than five years to provide more observations for credible and valid 
findings. Lastly, the study recommendations other studies to be conducted in the non-
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Appendix II: List of Commercial Banks in Kenya 
1. ABC Bank Kenya 
2. Bank of Africa 
3. Bank of Baroda 
4. Bank of India 
5. Barclays Bank of Kenya 
6. Citibank 
7. Commercial Bank of Africa 
8. Consolidated Bank of Kenya 
9. Cooperative Bank of Kenya 
10. Credit Bank 
11. Development Bank of Kenya 
12. Diamond Trust Bank 
13. Ecobank Kenya 
14. Equity Bank 
15. Family Bank 
16. Fidelity Commercial Bank Limited 
17. First Community Bank 
18. Giro Commercial Bank 
19. Guaranty Trust Bank Kenya 
20. Guardian Bank 
21. Gulf African Bank 
22. Habib Bank 
23. Habib Bank AG Zurich 
24. Housing Finance Company of Kenya 
25. I&M Bank 
26. Jamii Bora Bank 
27. Kenya Commercial Bank 
28. Middle East Bank Kenya 
29. National Bank of Kenya 
30. NIC Bank 
31. Oriental Commercial Bank 
32. Paramount Universal Bank 
33. Prime Bank (Kenya) 
34. Sidian Bank 
35. Spire Bank 
36. Stanbic Bank Kenya 
37. Standard Chartered Kenya 
38. Trans National Bank Kenya 
39. United Bank for Africa 
40. Victoria Commercial Bank 
Source: CBK (2017) 
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Appendix V: Secondary data used in the Study 
Bank Year 
Board 
Size Nonexec Female Nonkenyan Below50 
Tobin's 
Q LogDeposits CAR 
Asset 
Quality Logassets ROA 
1 2012 8 7 2 2 3 6.37414 7.09783 0.141648 0.070978 7.28492 0.922799 
1 2013 8 7 2 2 3 6.39867 7.32236 0.142193 0.071224 7.30945 1.9964 
1 2014 8 7 3 2 3 6.51543 7.73912 0.144787 0.072391 7.42621 3.00543 
1 2015 8 7 1 2 3 6.573 7.59669 0.146067 0.072967 7.48378 6.07396 
1 2016 8 7 2 1 2 6.69675 7.42044 0.148817 0.074204 7.60752 6.48582 
2 2012 11 9 5 3 4 7.53412 8.25781 0.167425 0.082578 8.4449 -0.03723 
2 2013 11 9 5 2 4 7.64592 8.36961 0.169909 0.083696 8.55669 0.905347 
2 2014 11 9 5 2 4 7.70556 8.42925 0.271235 0.084293 8.61634 2.20783 
2 2015 11 9 6 1 3 7.74046 8.96415 0.27201 0.084641 8.65123 2.65998 
2 2016 11 9 6 2 3 7.75616 8.47985 0.172359 0.084798 8.66693 5.72672 
3 2012 8 6 1 0 2 6.67825 7.40194 0.148405 0.074019 7.58902 4.678234 
3 2013 8 6 0 0 2 6.83271 7.5564 0.151838 0.075564 7.74348 4.27927 
3 2014 8 6 0 0 2 6.84271 7.5664 0.15206 0.075664 7.75349 4.95283 
3 2015 8 6 1 0 2 6.8702 7.59389 0.192671 0.075939 7.78098 4.44976 
3 2016 8 6 1 0 1 6.88831 7.612 0.153074 0.07612 7.79909 8.27081 
4 2012 9 8 3 1 3 7.16174 7.18543 0.15915 0.072167 8.07251 4.57824 
4 2013 9 8 2 1 2 7.2062 7.92989 0.180138 0.072574 8.11698 3.54097 
4 2014 9 8 1 2 2 7.24926 7.97295 0.161095 0.072968 8.16003 4.08362 
4 2015 9 8 2 2 2 7.28566 8.00935 0.161904 0.073302 8.19644 7.16817 
4 2016 9 8 2 2 2 7.35104 8.07473 0.163356 0.0739 8.26182 6.70367 
5 2012 7 6 0 0 3 6.72482 7.44851 0.14944 0.068169 7.63559 4.02823 
5 2013 7 6 0 0 2 6.83173 7.25542 0.151816 0.069147 7.7425 5.33389 
5 2014 7 6 1 0 2 6.91773 7.64142 0.153727 0.069934 7.82851 6.34963 
5 2015 7 6 1 0 1 6.99069 7.71438 0.155349 0.135927 7.90146 8.13535 
5 2016 7 6 1 0 1 7.11637 7.84006 0.118142 0.138142 8.02715 9.03852 
6 2012 6 5 0 0 1 6.24161 6.8653 0.138702 0.122729 7.15239 3.37452 
6 2013 6 5 0 0 1 6.35302 7.07671 0.141178 0.124692 7.2638 4.00324 
6 2014 6 5 0 0 0 6.4297 7.45339 0.122882 0.126043 7.34047 4.6035 
6 2015 6 5 0 0 0 6.52113 7.24482 0.144914 0.127654 7.43191 8.15554 
6 2016 6 5 0 0 0 6.5745 7.29819 0.1461 0.128594 7.48528 4.33406 
7 2012 10 7 1 1 2 6.2569 6.98059 0.119042 0.122998 7.16768 5.849243 
7 2013 10 7 1 2 2 6.3243 7.04799 0.14054 0.124186 7.23508 4.75128 
7 2014 10 8 2 2 1 6.39564 7.11933 0.142125 0.125443 7.30642 6.9962 
7 2015 10 8 2 2 1 6.45144 7.17513 0.113365 0.126426 7.36221 5.65299 
7 2016 8 6 2 1 2 6.54079 7.46448 0.145351 0.128 7.45157 9.31098 
8 2012 10 8 2 0 4 5.32282 6.04651 0.118285 0.10654 6.2336 3.025636 
8 2013 10 8 2 0 4 5.33913 6.06282 0.178647 0.106827 6.24991 2.93284 
8 2014 11 9 2 0 4 5.3881 6.11179 0.119735 0.10769 6.29887 3.89237 
8 2015 11 9 3 0 4 5.75245 6.37614 0.127832 0.11411 6.66323 7.08093 
8 2016 11 9 3 0 4 5.69172 6.41541 0.156483 0.113039 6.6025 5.73137 
9 2012 10 9 0 0 3 5.25495 5.97864 0.116777 0.105344 6.16573 -1.99092 
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9 2013 10 9 0 0 4 5.24363 5.96732 0.126525 0.059673 6.1544 1.05282 
9 2014 10 9 0 0 4 5.34627 6.06996 0.118806 0.0607 6.25705 1.57591 
9 2015 10 9 0 0 4 5.38672 6.21041 0.119705 0.061104 6.2975 2.03508 
9 2016 10 9 0 0 3 5.41809 6.14178 0.120402 0.061418 6.32887 6.43796 
10 2012 9 6 1 1 2 5.83211 6.7558 0.129603 0.065558 6.74289 5.15092 
10 2013 9 6 1 1 2 5.91872 6.64241 0.141527 0.066424 6.8295 4.4654 
10 2014 9 6 2 1 1 5.97887 6.70256 0.132864 0.067026 6.88965 5.0153 
10 2015 9 6 2 1 1 6.04441 6.7681 0.13432 0.067681 6.95519 9.18018 
10 2016 9 6 3 0 0 6.10289 6.82658 0.13562 0.068266 7.01367 4.70509 
11 2012 12 9 3 0 2 6.70014 7.52383 0.168892 0.074238 7.61092 1.39254 
11 2013 12 9 3 2 2 6.72673 7.45042 0.149483 0.0736 7.6375 0.293593 
11 2014 13 10 4 2 3 6.77504 7.49873 0.150556 0.074078 7.68582 1.60992 
11 2015 13 10 4 2 3 6.82867 7.55237 0.151748 0.074608 7.73945 5.0436 
11 2016 13 10 4 2 3 6.86743 7.59112 0.162609 0.07499 7.7782 3.80285 
12 2012 5 4 1 0 1 4.83061 5.7543 0.147347 0.054869 5.74138 0.309248 
12 2013 5 4 1 0 1 4.87983 5.60352 0.118441 0.055355 5.7906 2.26426 
12 2014 5 4 1 0 1 4.92904 5.85273 0.129534 0.055842 5.83982 2.3155 
12 2015 5 4 0 0 2 4.97826 5.70195 0.110628 0.056328 5.88904 1.56301 
12 2016 5 4 0 0 2 5.02748 5.75117 0.131722 0.056814 5.93826 5.46512 
13 2012 10 7 4 0 4 6.73049 7.55418 0.149566 0.073638 7.64126 3.092364 
13 2013 10 7 4 0 4 6.77722 7.50091 0.160605 0.120015 7.688 4.56408 
13 2014 10 7 3 0 4 6.78426 7.40795 0.150761 0.120127 7.69503 5.40439 
13 2015 10 7 3 0 3 6.82519 7.54888 0.151671 0.120782 7.73596 11.7633 
13 2016 10 7 3 0 3 6.85549 7.57918 0.152344 0.121267 7.76627 6.77762 
14 2012 12 11 4 1 4 6.29873 7.32242 0.139972 0.112359 7.20951 -6.09231 
14 2013 12 11 4 1 4 6.39029 7.11398 0.152006 0.113824 7.30106 -1.13605 
14 2014 12 11 4 1 4 6.40923 7.13292 0.142427 0.114127 7.32001 -2.46743 
14 2015 11 10 5 1 3 6.48298 7.30667 0.144066 0.115307 7.39375 -9.31035 
14 2016 11 10 5 0 3 6.56593 7.28962 0.159096 0.116634 7.47671 1.78461 
15 2012 12 11 4 3 2 6.06272 6.88641 0.134727 0.108583 6.9735 -7.01091 
15 2013 12 11 4 4 2 6.08924 6.81293 0.135316 0.096744 7.00002 2.33179 
15 2014 12 11 3 4 2 6.161 6.88469 0.136911 0.097763 7.07178 1.53744 
15 2015 12 11 3 5 1 6.10962 6.93331 0.135769 0.097033 7.0204 -8.59806 
15 2016 12 11 4 5 1 6.15101 6.8747 0.136689 0.097621 7.06179 2.45937 
16 2012 8 7 3 3 1 7.53152 8.25521 0.167367 0.117224 8.4423 6.05628 
16 2013 8 7 2 3 1 7.61383 8.33752 0.169196 0.118393 8.5246 7.40022 
16 2014 8 7 2 2 2 7.70351 8.4272 0.171189 0.119666 8.61429 8.42526 
16 2015 8 7 2 2 2 7.72231 8.546 0.171607 0.119933 8.63309 9.76353 
16 2016 8 7 2 3 2 7.74317 8.46686 0.17207 0.120229 8.65395 7.36633 
17 2012 8 6 1 0 1 5.46587 6.18956 0.121464 0.087892 6.37665 0.90921 
17 2013 8 6 1 0 1 5.87895 6.60264 0.130643 0.093757 6.78973 4.46698 
17 2014 8 6 1 0 1 5.79552 6.51921 0.128789 0.12204 6.7063 4.78097 
17 2015 8 6 2 0 1 5.80003 6.52372 0.12889 0.122124 6.71081 5.72979 
17 2016 8 6 2 0 2 5.74155 6.46524 0.12759 0.121029 6.65233 8.03892 
18 2012 12 10 3 4 3 5.54798 6.27167 0.123289 0.117406 6.45876 2.29813 
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18 2013 12 10 3 4 3 5.96106 6.68475 0.132468 0.125139 6.87184 2.03895 
18 2014 12 10 2 4 2 5.90467 6.62836 0.131215 0.124083 6.81544 1.73964 
18 2015 12 10 2 4 2 5.90917 6.73286 0.131315 0.124167 6.81995 4.22763 
18 2016 12 10 2 4 1 5.8507 6.57439 0.130015 0.123072 6.76147 8.48862 
19 2012 10 6 2 2 4 5.49683 6.22052 0.122152 0.116448 6.40761 -0.21658 
19 2013 10 6 3 3 4 5.90991 6.6336 0.131331 0.124181 6.82069 1.0991 
19 2014 10 6 2 3 3 5.85351 6.6772 0.130078 0.123125 6.76429 2.14595 
19 2015 10 6 2 3 3 5.87367 6.59736 0.130526 0.123503 6.78445 6.09058 
19 2016 10 6 2 2 2 5.81519 6.53888 0.129227 0.122408 6.72597 5.10887 
20 2012 8 6 3 0 1 5.88966 6.61335 0.130881 0.075392 6.80044 3.0827 
20 2013 8 6 3 0 1 5.93542 6.45911 0.131898 0.075914 6.8462 2.65191 
20 2014 8 6 2 0 0 5.98118 6.70487 0.132915 0.076435 6.89195 2.75955 
20 2015 8 6 2 0 0 6.0305 6.75419 0.134011 0.076998 6.94128 6.73864 
20 2016 8 6 2 0 1 6.08741 6.8111 0.135276 0.077646 6.99818 7.14039 
21 2012 12 11 5 2 1 6.45488 7.17857 0.143442 0.081836 7.36566 2.00915 
21 2013 12 11 5 2 3 6.50064 7.22433 0.144459 0.082357 7.41142 3.02569 
21 2014 12 11 6 3 3 6.5464 7.27009 0.145476 0.082879 7.45718 3.10285 
21 2015 12 11 6 3 3 6.59216 7.31585 0.146492 0.083401 7.50293 7.60773 
21 2016 12 11 6 3 3 6.63791 7.3616 0.147509 0.083922 7.54869 7.68378 
22 2012 12 11 4 1 4 5.79437 6.21806 0.128764 0.074306 6.70514 2.77688 
22 2013 11 10 4 1 4 5.92192 6.64561 0.131598 0.07576 6.83269 3.02781 
22 2014 10 9 4 0 3 5.98573 6.70942 0.133016 0.076487 6.89651 2.97199 
22 2015 12 11 4 1 3 6.10864 6.83233 0.135748 0.077889 7.01942 5.66313 
22 2016 11 10 4 1 3 6.26149 6.58518 0.139144 0.079631 7.17226 4.81223 
23 2012 9 7 2 0 1 5.72735 6.45104 0.127274 0.080638 6.63812 3.66565 
23 2013 8 6 1 0 1 5.86756 6.59125 0.13039 0.082391 6.77834 5.10395 
23 2014 9 7 1 0 1 5.89921 6.6229 0.131094 0.082786 6.80999 4.26188 
23 2015 9 7 1 0 2 5.9931 6.81679 0.13318 0.08396 6.90387 6.01063 
23 2016 9 7 1 0 2 6.0587 6.78239 0.134638 0.08478 6.96947 8.49566 
24 2012 8 6 1 0 2 5.823 6.54669 0.1294 0.081834 6.73378 3.90024 
24 2013 8 6 1 0 2 5.9624 6.48609 0.132498 0.083576 6.87318 5.36827 
24 2014 8 6 1 0 3 6.13008 6.85377 0.136224 0.085672 7.04086 6.39925 
24 2015 8 6 0 0 3 6.17711 6.9008 0.137269 0.08626 7.08789 8.62133 
24 2016 8 6 0 0 3 6.30813 7.03182 0.140181 0.087898 7.2189 3.63409 
25 2012 9 7 3 2 1 6.14979 6.87348 0.136662 0.085919 7.06057 5.98127 
25 2013 9 7 3 2 1 6.31396 7.03765 0.14031 0.087971 7.22473 5.86372 
25 2014 9 7 3 2 1 6.3785 7.30219 0.141744 0.088777 7.28928 6.24347 
25 2015 9 7 3 2 2 6.43392 7.15761 0.142976 0.08947 7.3447 12.0763 
25 2016 9 7 2 2 3 6.52596 7.24965 0.145021 0.090621 7.43674 5.47764 
26 2012 10 9 3 3 4 6.42947 7.15316 0.142877 0.089415 7.34025 -3.10912 
26 2013 10 9 3 3 4 6.47869 7.40238 0.143971 0.09003 7.38947 1.58684 
26 2014 10 9 4 3 4 6.52791 7.2516 0.145065 0.090645 7.43868 1.74414 
26 2015 10 9 3 3 5 6.57713 7.30082 0.146158 0.09126 7.4879 6.06267 
26 2016 10 9 2 3 4 6.62634 7.65003 0.147252 0.091875 7.53712 -7.15591 
27 2012 8 7 2 0 3 6.47523 7.19892 0.143894 0.089986 7.38601 5.19864 
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27 2013 8 7 1 0 3 6.52445 7.24814 0.144988 0.090602 7.43522 6.33936 
27 2014 8 7 1 0 4 6.57366 7.79735 0.146081 0.091217 7.48444 6.0403 
27 2015 8 7 1 0 4 6.62288 7.34657 0.147175 0.091832 7.53366 10.7238 
27 2016 8 7 1 0 4 6.6721 7.39579 0.148269 0.092447 7.58288 9.93938 
28 2012 8 7 1 0 1 6.73221 7.4559 0.149605 0.093199 7.64298 0.6513 
28 2013 9 7 1 0 1 6.80115 7.52484 0.151137 0.094061 7.71193 5.54252 
28 2014 9 7 2 0 1 6.83581 7.5595 0.151907 0.094494 7.74659 5.35282 
28 2015 9 7 1 0 2 6.95578 7.67947 0.154573 0.095993 7.86656 12.8309 
28 2016 9 7 1 0 1 6.96842 7.69211 0.154854 0.096151 7.8792 2.98615 
29 2012 7 5 0 2 0 7.04055 7.76424 0.156457 0.097053 7.95132 -1.90913 
29 2013 7 5 0 2 0 7.09339 7.81708 0.157631 0.097713 8.00416 1.77734 
29 2014 7 5 0 2 0 7.18775 7.81144 0.159728 0.098893 8.09852 2.52128 
29 2015 7 5 1 2 1 7.22757 7.95126 0.160613 0.099391 8.13834 3.18387 
29 2016 7 5 1 2 1 7.26896 7.99265 0.161532 0.149463 8.17974 7.97213 
30 2012 10 8 3 0 4 6.29829 7.02198 0.139962 0.131311 7.20907 0.17614 
30 2013 10 8 3 0 4 6.39299 7.11668 0.142066 0.133082 7.30377 2.04287 
30 2014 10 8 3 0 4 6.53594 7.25963 0.145243 0.135755 7.44672 2.23485 
30 2015 10 8 2 0 4 6.627 7.35069 0.147267 0.137458 7.53778 6.83441 
30 2016 10 8 3 0 5 6.75391 7.7776 0.150087 0.139831 7.66469 4.23647 
31 2012 12 11 4 0 3 6.7173 7.44099 0.149273 0.139146 7.62807 3.66 
31 2013 12 11 3 0 4 6.78 7.50369 0.150667 0.140319 7.69077 4.36186 
31 2014 12 11 4 0 4 6.87458 7.59827 0.152769 0.142088 7.78536 5.048 
31 2015 12 11 4 0 4 6.8866 7.61029 0.153036 0.142312 7.79738 6.94361 
31 2016 12 11 4 0 3 7.0325 7.75619 0.156278 0.145041 7.94328 8.26878 
32 2012 8 7 1 3 2 7.47321 8.47041 0.166071 0.158397 8.6575 0.309126 
32 2013 8 7 1 3 2 7.50042 8.49762 0.166676 0.158905 8.6847 1.89197 
32 2014 8 7 1 3 2 7.54134 8.53854 0.167585 0.159671 8.72562 2.9692 
32 2015 8 7 1 3 3 7.5974 8.5946 0.168831 0.160719 8.78169 7.30339 
32 2016 8 7 2 3 3 7.64642 8.64362 0.169921 0.161636 8.83071 5.28434 
33 2012 11 8 2 1 3 5.57246 6.29615 0.123832 0.117738 6.48323 1.11091 
33 2013 11 8 2 1 3 5.85097 6.57466 0.130022 0.122946 6.76175 1.34965 
33 2014 11 8 2 2 2 5.91485 6.63854 0.131441 0.124141 6.82563 1.36088 
33 2015 11 8 2 2 2 6.06567 6.78936 0.134793 0.126961 6.97644 4.95286 
33 2016 11 8 2 2 2 6.16473 6.88842 0.136994 0.128813 7.0755 9.54477 
34 2012 6 5 1 0 1 5.76756 6.49125 0.128168 0.121386 6.67834 3.87657 
34 2013 6 5 1 0 1 5.95724 6.68093 0.132383 0.065473 6.86802 4.17828 
34 2014 6 5 1 0 1 6.02091 6.7446 0.133798 0.066097 6.93169 4.10743 
34 2015 6 5 2 0 0 6.13112 6.85481 0.136247 0.067177 7.0419 8.68187 
34 2016 6 5 2 0 0 6.22807 6.95176 0.138401 0.068127 7.13884 2.28593 
35 2012 6 4 1 0 2 5.99891 6.7226 0.133309 0.065882 6.90969 5.9011 
35 2013 6 4 1 0 2 6.15542 6.87911 0.136787 0.067415 7.0662 6.47119 
35 2014 6 4 1 0 1 6.27198 6.99568 0.139377 0.068558 7.18276 6.48607 
35 2015 6 4 0 0 1 6.3908 7.11449 0.142018 0.069722 7.30158 6.56827 
35 2016 6 4 0 0 0 6.42406 7.14775 0.142757 0.070048 7.33484 2.10174 
36 2012 9 8 0 2 3 5.70906 6.43275 0.126868 0.063041 6.61984 1.52093 
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36 2013 9 8 0 2 3 5.84846 6.57215 0.129966 0.064407 6.75924 2.5732 
36 2014 9 8 0 3 2 6.01614 6.73983 0.133692 0.06605 6.92691 3.23712 
36 2015 9 8 0 3 2 6.06317 6.78686 0.134737 0.066511 6.97394 11.6365 
36 2016 9 8 0 3 1 6.18033 6.90402 0.137341 0.084737 7.0911 6.18948 
37 2012 8 7 1 1 1 6.27626 6.99995 0.139472 0.115499 7.18704 0.85649 
37 2013 8 7 1 1 2 6.28582 7.00951 0.139685 0.115657 7.1966 -5.53582 
37 2014 8 7 1 1 1 6.36137 7.08506 0.141364 0.116904 7.27215 -6.83618 
37 2015 8 7 2 2 1 6.44157 7.16526 0.143146 0.118227 7.35234 -12.3043 
37 2016 8 7 2 2 0 6.57433 7.29802 0.146096 0.120417 7.4851 -2.8814 
38 2012 8 6 2 0 2 6.67307 7.39676 0.14829 0.122047 7.58385 3.51765 
38 2013 8 6 1 0 3 6.71883 7.44252 0.149307 0.122802 7.62961 3.43957 
38 2014 8 6 1 0 3 6.85952 7.58321 0.152434 0.125123 7.7703 4.37641 
38 2015 8 6 2 0 2 6.90837 7.63206 0.153519 0.125929 7.81915 9.85282 
38 2016 8 6 2 0 1 7.02454 7.74823 0.156101 0.127846 7.93532 3.24928 
 
